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ABSTRACT
Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is
attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the
broad applicability and the extensive study of such mod-
els, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental
questions regarding their properties and efficiency remain
unanswered. We consider such a service exchange model
and analyze the users’ interactions under three different ap-
proaches. First, we study a centrally designed service al-
location policy that yields the fair total service each user
should receive based on the service it offers to the others.
Accordingly, we consider a competitive market where each
user determines selfishly its allocation policy so as to maxi-
mize the service it receives in return, and a coalitional game
model where users are allowed to coordinate their policies.
We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange allo-
cation for both game theoretic formulations, which also co-
incides with the central fair service allocation. Furthermore,
we characterize its properties in terms of the coalitions that
emerge and the equilibrium allocations, and analyze its de-
pendency on the underlying network graph. That servicing
policy is the natural reference point to the various mecha-
nisms that are currently proposed to incentivize user partic-
ipation and improve the efficiency of such networked service
(or, resource) exchange markets.
1. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. Today we are witnessing a renewed inter-
est about models for exchanging services and resources in
(or, over) networks, that go beyond the well-known peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing idea. Some examples in communica-
tion networks are the WiFi sharing communities [11], [32],
the mobile data sharing applications [27], the commercial or
community mesh networks [8], [34], and various peer-assisted
services [22], Fig. 1. Similar schemes have been studied and
implemented for other technological systems as well, e.g.,
for renewable energy sharing over smart grid [15], [29] where
users share their energy surpluses with each other. Finally,
there is nowadays a plethora of online platforms, motivated
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Figure 1: Instances of Service Exchange in Networks:
a content sharing network, and an Internet sharing resi-
dential/community mesh network.
by the sharing economy concept [6], which facilitate the ex-
change of commodities and services among users who, for
example, are co-located, have common interests, etc, [1],
[14], [17], [25], [31].
In essence, all the above scenarios apply the idea of col-
laborative consumption [10] of underutilized resources (such
as the Internet access) to networks with autonomous and
self-interested nodes (or, users). Whenever a user has some
idle resource, he offers it to other users who at that time
have excess needs, and benefits in exchange from the re-
sources they offer to him in the future [13]. The goal is to
exploit the nodes’ complementarity in resource availability
and demand, and increase the benefits for all the partici-
pants. Such models capture also more static settings where
users have different preferences for the various resources, and
exchange them in order to acquire those that are more valu-
able to them [33]. There is a broad consensus that these
models are of major importance for the economy, society
and technological evolution [6], [26]. However, despite their
significance and wide applicability, and although they have
been subject to extensive research (e.g., in the context of
P2P networks [5], [37]), some very important related ques-
tions remain unanswered.
Definition and Properties of a Fair Exchange Policy. This
is one of the most critical issues in these cooperation schemes.
Ideally, from a system design point of view, each user should
receive service (or, resource) commensurate to its contribu-
tion. However, this is not always possible because there is an
underlying graph that prescribes, for each user, the subset
of the users it can serve and receive services from1. Ad-
ditionally, there may be multiple feasible service exchange
solutions that differ on the amount of service each user re-
ceives. We would prefer to select among them a fair outcome
1For example, in mesh networks the graph captures which nodes
are within communication range, while in smart grid networks
the graph shows which microgrids can exchange energy without
significant transfer losses.
that balances the exchanges as much as possible. The exis-
tence and the characterization of the properties of such fair
policies (e.g., their dependency on the underlying graph) is
an important and currently open question.
Existence and Fairness of Competitive Equilibriums. Ad-
ditionally, most often these systems are not controlled by
a central entity that can exogenously impose such a fair
solution. Instead, each user tries to greedily maximize its
own benefit by allocating its idle resource to those users
from which it expects to receive more service in return.
A first question here is if such a competitive interaction
among the nodes admits an equilibrium allocation, where
each node cannot unilaterally improve the resource it accu-
mulates. Also, we need to analyze how these equilibriums
are affected by the graph structure and the nodes’ resources.
Finally, it is important to understand if such equilibriums
are related to the centrally designed fair policy discussed
above.
Robustness of the Fair Exchange Policy. The latter ques-
tion is related to the robustness of the fair policy: when a
central designer proposes such a fair policy, is it possible for
a user to deviate from it and improve his performance? More
interestingly, in many cases it is possible to have a subset of
users that deviate from the fair policy by forming a coalition
and excluding non-members from bartering. For example,
in a WiFi community a subset of users may decide to serve
only each other, expecting that this will increase their bene-
fits. Such strategies are very likely to deteriorate the overall
system performance. A key challenge is to explore whether
the fair policy is robust to such group deviations.
Methodology and Contributions. In order to shed
light on these questions, we employ a general model that ab-
stracts all the above scenarios. We consider a set of nodes,
where each one has a certain idle resource that it allocates to
its neighbors, and unsaturated demand for the resources of
others. The model captures situations where the nodes have
complementary resource availability over time, or generic
static bartering markets where nodes simply have different
preferences for the resources. Neighborhood relationships
are described by a bidirectional connected graph. The ex-
change ratio (or, simply ratio) of total received over allo-
cated resource2 characterizes the performance of each node,
as it quantifies the resource that it receives for each resource
unit it offers.
From a system point of view, a central designer would pre-
fer to have a vector of exchange ratios where each coordinate,
that corresponds to a node, has value equal to one. Often
this will not be possible due to the graph exchange con-
straints and asymmetries in nodes’ resource availability. For
that cases, the lexicographically maximum (lex-optimal), or
max-min, exchange vector is a meaningful performance cri-
terion as it is Pareto optimal and balances the exchanged
resources as much as possible [24].
In the absence of a network controller however, we assume
that each node makes greedy myopic allocation decisions so
as to maximize the aggregate resource it receives in return.
The interactions of the nodes give rise to a competitive mar-
ket, which however differ from previous similar models [28],
[4], [37] due to the existence of the graph and the absence
2The idle resource can be the Internet bandwidth a user shares
within a WiFi community during a month, the uploading capacity
of a node in a P2P overlay. Similarly, the demand is the average
request for additional Internet bandwidth (WiFi), the download-
ing capacity of a peer node, etc. Hereafter, we will use the term
resource and service interchangeably.
of side-payments (money) among the nodes (bartering). We
introduce the concept of exchange equilibrium that is ap-
propriate for this setting, characterize the equilibrium allo-
cations, and study its relation to the max-min fair policy.
Accordingly, we assume that subset of nodes can coor-
dinate and form coalitions exchanging resources only with
each other. A coalitional graph-constrained game with non-
transferable utility (NTU) is identified in the above set-up.
We focus on the existence and properties of stable equilib-
rium allocations. Given a certain global allocation, if there
is a subset of nodes that when they reallocate their own re-
sources among themselves manage to improve the exchange
ratio of at least one node in the subset, then they have an
incentive to deviate from the global allocation (and hence
destabilize it). Therefore, when an allocation is in equilib-
rium, it should be strongly stable and no such subset should
exist.
We study the above frameworks, that differ on the as-
sumptions about the system control and the users behavior,
and find a surprising connection among them. In particular:
(i) We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange
ratio vector that is a solution for the competitive market,
and lies in the core of the NTU graph-constrained coali-
tional game, being also strongly stable. This is the max-min
fair (lex-optimal) ratio vector. It reveals that a centrally
designed meaningful fair solution can be reached by nodes
who act independently and selfishly, and it is also robust
to group deviations. This finding has many implications for
the applicability of such fair policies to decentralized and
autonomous graph-constrained systems.
(ii) We show that the equilibrium exhibits rich structure
and a number of interesting properties. For example, in the
equilibrium allocation there is exchange of resources only
among the nodes with the lowest exchange ratios and the
nodes with the highest ratios, the nodes with the second
lowest ratios with the set of the second highest ratios, and
so on. We also study how the exchange ratios are affected by
the graph properties, such as the node degree. This latter
aspect is particularly important from a network design point
of view as it reveals, among others, the impact a link removal
or addition has on the equilibrium. Our findings hold for any
graph, and therefore they can help a controller to predict or
even dictate the exchange equilibrium.
(iii) We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that finds
the lex-optimal exchange ratio vector and the resource ex-
change strategies that lead to it. Hence, it can also be used
to find the equilibriums of the respective competitive and
coalitional games. This is a highly non-trivial task in such
exchange markets, that is further compounded here due to
the graph constraints.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we
introduce the model, and in Sec. 3 we prove the existence
and analyze the properties of the lex-optimal exchange pol-
icy. In Sec. 4 we define and solve the coalitional and the
competitive games. In Sec. 5 we provide a polynomial al-
gorithm for computing the lex-optimal ratios. We present
several numerical examples in Sec. 6. In Sec. 7 we discuss
related works, and conclude in Sec. 8. In the Appendix we
provide the additional proofs.
2. MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a service exchange market that is modeled as
an undirected connected graph G = (N , E) with node and
edge set N and E , respectively. Let Ni = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}
be the set of neighbors of node i ∈ N , and Di > 0 its idle
resource (endowment). Let dij ≥ 0 be the resource that
node i allocates to node j ∈ Ni. We assume that each non-
isolated node allocates all its (idle) resource3, i.e.,∑
j∈Ni
dij = Di, ∀ i ∈ N , Ni 6= ∅. (1)
A vector d = (dij)(i,j)∈E satisfying (1) is called “allocation”.
The set of allocations is denoted by D. Note that as long as
not all nodes are isolated, i.e., E 6= ∅, it holds D 6= ∅.
This model captures either (i) a static setting where each
user has a certain amount of a perfectly divisible resource
which wishes to trade with other, more valuable to him, re-
sources, or (ii) a dynamic setting where users have at random
time instances a single unit of unsplittable excess resource
which they allocate to one of their neighbors expecting sim-
ilar benefits in the future. This latter dynamic setting will
become more clear in the sequel.
A vector r of received resources induced by an allocation
d ∈ D is called feasible. The set of feasible received resource
vectors when E 6= ∅ is defined as:
R =
{
r = (ri)i∈N : ri =
∑
j∈Ni
dji, i ∈ N , d ∈ D
}
, (2)
where we adopt the convention that for any isolated node i it
is ri = 0. In case E = ∅, we define R = {r : ri = 0, i ∈ N}.
Throughout this work, we will be interested in the ex-
change ratio (or, simply ratio) vector ρ = (ρi = ri/Di :
i ∈ N ), where the ith coordinate quantifies the aggregate
amount of resource that node i receives per unit of resource
that offers to its neighbors. Notice that, under assumption
(1), maximizing ρi ensures the maximization of ri. We de-
note by P the set of all feasible ratio vectors. In the sequel,
we consider three different problem formulations based on
the above model.
2.1 Fairness Framework
In this setting, the total allocated resource is always equal
to
∑
i∈N Di, and therefore the various allocations differ on
how they split this amount across the nodes. A centrally de-
signed policy for this cooperative setting would ideally allo-
cate to every node i ∈ N resource equal to its contribution,
i.e., ri = Di. However, due to the graph that constraints
resource exchanges, and the different resource endowments
of the nodes, such policies will not be realizable in general.
Given this, the designer would prefer to ensure the most
balanced allocation.
A suitable method to achieve this goal is to employ the
lexicographic optimal (or, lex-optimal) criterion, which has
been extensively used for resource allocation and load bal-
ancing in communication networks [12], [24], [35]. This
multi-objective optimization method first increases as much
as possible the allocated resource to the node with the smaller
exchange ratio. Next, if there are many choices, it attempts
to increase the resource allocated to the node with the sec-
ond smaller exchange ratio, and so on. The resulting alloca-
tion is max-min fair, thus as balanced as possible. Next we
provide the necessary definitions.
Definition 1. Lexicographical order. Let x and y be
N-dimensional vectors, and φ(x) and φ(y) the respective
N-dimensional vectors that are created by sorting the com-
ponents of x and y respectively, in non-decreasing order.
3For example, in P2P overlays, each node allocates all its uplink
bandwidth, and in other settings it exchanges resources for which
it has zero valuation (e.g., excess food).
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Figure 2: A 4-node graph with node resource Di = 10,
∀i. Dashed arrows indicate resource exchange under two
different allocations (values shown internal and external
of the graph). Both allocations yield ratios ρi = 1, ∀i.
We say that x is lexicographically larger than y, denoted
by x ≻ y, if the first non-zero component of the vector
φ(x) − φ(y) is positive. The notation x  y means that
either x ≻ y or, x = y.
It is easy to see that the set of received resource vectors
R defined in (2) is compact and convex. Hence, as is shown
in [35], there is a unique lex-optimal r∗ ∈ R such that, with
ρ∗ = (r∗i /Di)i∈N and for any ρ = (ri/Di)i∈N ∈ P, it holds
ρ∗  ρ, ∀ r ∈ R. We are also interested in the respec-
tive lex-optimal allocations d, which are those that result in
the unique lex-optimal ratio vector. Note that there may
be many allocations d¯ for which ρ¯ = ρ∗, as shown in Fig.
2. Within this framework, we are interested in studying the
properties of the lex-optimal exchange ratio vector, and the
respective lex-optimal allocations, for any graph G = (N , E)
and any endowments {Di}i∈N .
2.2 Coalitional Framework
Before providing the details of this framework, let us intro-
duce some additional notation. We denote by GS = (S , ES)
the subgraph of G induced by a nonempty set of nodes
S ⊆ N , i.e., the graph with node set S , and edge set the
edges (i, j) ∈ E , with i, j ∈ S . By“allocation on S”, we mean
a vector dS = {dij}(i,j)∈ES defined on graph GS = (S , ES)
satisfying (1) (with N ← S and E ← ES). We denote by
DS the set of all allocations on S , and by RS the set of all
received resource vectors on S which can be obtained by any
allocation on S . By definition it is R{i} = {0}, ∀ i ∈ N .
We assume here that the nodes are able to coordinate with
each other, they can form coalitions and deviate from the
proposed fair solution if this will ensure higher resources for
one or more of them. In game theoretic terms, this behavior
leads to a coalitional (or, cooperative) game [23] played by
the nodes. Specifically, we call any subset of nodes S ⊆ N a
coalition when they allocate their resources only among each
other. That is, there is no resource exchange among nodes
in S and nodes in its complement set Sc = N − S . Hence,
the feasible resource vectors that nodes in S get, are the
vectors of the set RS . We also refer to the set N as the grand
coalition. This coalitional game is one with non-transferable
utilities, as the received resource vector r cannot be split
arbitrary among the nodes, due to the exchange constraints
imposed by the graph and the lack of side payments. More
formally, we define [23]:
Definition 2. Coalitional Service Exchange Game. A
non-transferable utility (NTU) game in graph form consists
of the triplet < N , G, {RS ,S ∈ N} >, where N is the set of
players (nodes) with initial resource endowments {Di}i∈N ,
and G = (N , E) is the graph describing the service exchange
possibilities among the nodes. Moreover, RS , S ⊆ N , is the
set of feasible |S|-dimensional vectors of players’ received
resources {ri}i∈S , satisfying properties (i) R{i} = {0} , ∀i ∈
N , (ii) RS is closed and bounded.
Our goal is to study the existence and the properties of
self-enforcing allocations. This property is formally cap-
tured by the notion of stability for the grand coalition.
Definition 3. Stability. An allocation d, and the respec-
tive resource vector r is called strongly stable if for any node
set S ⊆ N , there is no allocation d̂S on the induced sub-
graph GS = (S ,ES), such that rˆi ≥ ri for all i ∈ S , and
rˆj > rj for at least one node j ∈ S . The allocation is called
weakly stable if for any node set S ⊆ N , there is no alloca-
tion d̂S such that rˆi > ri for all i ∈ S .
Note that strong stability implies weak stability but not
the other way around. In particular, the concept of weak
stability for the grand coalition is directly related to the
concept of the core which is formally defined4 [23]:
Definition 4. Core. Given an NTU coalitional game <
N , G, {RS , S ∈ N} >, the core of R is defined as the subset
of R which consists of all received resource vectors r ∈ R,
such that for any possible coalition S and any allocation
dˆ ∈ D|S|, if rˆi > ri, for all i ∈ S , then rˆ /∈ RS .
In this coalitional framework, we ask the question: Is there
a (weakly or strongly) stable allocation for this service ex-
change coalitional game, and if yes, what are its properties
in terms of allocations and exchange ratios?
2.3 Competitive Framework
Assume now that each node i ∈ N is an independent
decision maker, devising its allocation vector di =
(
dij
)
j∈Ni
so as to maximize the resource ri it receives. In such a
competitive market setting, the nodes are allowed to select
any policy that satisfies eq. (1), i.e., allocating their entire
resource (market clearing condition). Namely, the solution
concept for this market is related to the competitive (or,
Walrasian) equilibrium [4], [21], which has been also applied
in communication networks [5], and extended to graphical
economies (which exhibit localities) [19], [20]. However, for
the problem under consideration, there do not exist explicit
price variables (or, price signals), and hence we employ a
different equilibrium concept:
Definition 5. Exchange Equilibrium. An allocation d
is an exchange equilibrium, if and only if (iff) for any node
i ∈ N it holds (i) dji = ρidij for all j ∈ Ni, and (ii) if dji > 0
for some j ∈ Ni then ρj = mink∈Ni ρk.
In other words, at the equilibrium each node i exchanges
services only with its neighbors that trade in the lowest ex-
change ratio, so as to receive the maximum possible total
service. Additionally, all the nodes that interact with i,
have the same exchange ratio, while there may exist neigh-
bors that do not allocate any resource to it. These latter
nodes will certainly have higher exchange ratios, i.e., re-
ciprocate with less resource for each unit of resource they
receive. In this context, the question we want to tackle is
the following: Does this game have exchange equilibrium(s),
and if so, what are its properties and how does it depend on
the graph G.
3. LEX-OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS
4With a slight abuse of terminology we refer both to the received
resource vectors and the respective allocations as stable.
In this section we study the properties of the lex-optimal
vector ρ∗ and the respective allocations. These results hold
for any graphG = (N , E), and resource endowments {Di}i∈N .
To avoid trivial cases, we assume that there are no iso-
lated nodes in the network5. We give first some notations.
We denote the set of neighbors of nodes in a set S , that
do not belong to S , by N (S) = ∪i∈SNi − S . Given an
allocation d, for each node i ∈ N we define the subset
Di = {j ∈ Ni : dij > 0} of nodes that receive resource from
i, and the subset of nodes that don’t receive resource Hi =
Ni − Di = {j ∈ Ni : dij = 0}. Also, we define the subset
Ri = {j ∈ Ni : dji > 0} of nodes that give resource to i.
For a given r, the set of different values (levels) the coor-
dinates of vector ρ take, will be denoted by lk, i = 1, ..., K ≤
N , where l1 < l2 < ... < lK . The index of the level to which
ρi is equal, is denoted by k(i), i.e., lk(i) = ρi. We call k(i)
the “level of node i”. The set of nodes with level m is de-
noted by Lm = {i ∈ N : k(i) = m}. If a subset of nodes
S ⊆ N has the same level under an allocation d, then we
denote the index of this level by k (S). Note that the above
quantities depend on the allocation d, and hence, in order
to facilitate notation, we will use the same overline symbol
for them whenever applicable.
Properties. An important well-known property of the
lex-optimal policy is that it is Pareto efficient [21], [24], i.e.,
we cannot increase the exchange ratio for one node without
decreasing the ratio of another node. The first property of
the lex-optimal allocations that we prove is that the neigh-
bors of each node i ∈ N , that receive non-zero resource from
i, belong to the same exchange ratio level set6. Moreover,
all the neighbors that do not receive resource from i, have a
higher level index. Specifically:
Lemma 1. Let d∗ be a lex-optimal allocation, and let i ∈
N . Then all nodes j ∈ D∗i have the same level l
∗
k(D∗i )
and
hence belong to the same set L∗k(D∗
i
). Moreover, for any node
j ∈ H∗i , it is l
∗
k(j) ≥ l
∗
k(D∗i )
.
Proof. Consider a lex-optimal allocation d¯ and let j1, j2 be
such that d¯ij1 > 0, d¯ij2 > 0, but j1 ∈ L
∗
m and j2 ∈ L
∗
n with
m < n. Recall that the lex-optimal price vectors - and hence
the respective level sets - are unique so we use the star (∗)
notation for them. We can then move some resource from
j2 and give it to j1 while ensuring that with the resulting
allocation d̂, it is l∗k(j1) < l̂k(j1) ≤ l̂k(j2) < l
∗
k(j2)
. Since
the received resources of all other nodes remain the same,
it follows that r̂ ≻ r¯ = r∗, which is a contradiction as we
assumed that it is lex-optimal. Assume next that d∗ij = 0 for
a node j ∈ Ni for which it holds that l
∗
k(j) < l
∗
k(D¯i)
. Using a
similar argument we arrive at a contradiction again. 
Note that this lemma shows already that lex-optimal allo-
cations have some of the required properties of exchange
equilibriums. As will be shown later there are lex-optimal
allocations that are in fact exchange equilibriums.
We need some additional notation at this point. Let d ∈ D
and assumeK ≥ 2, i.e., the allocation has at least two levels.
Define Q1 = N , and for K ≥ 3:
Qk = N − ∪
k−1
m=1 (Lm ∪ LK−m+1) , 2 ≤ k ≤ ⌈K/2⌉.
5If a graph G has a set of isolated nodes I then we set ρi = 0 for
all i ∈ I and we proceed by considering the graph GN−I .
6Recall that this ratio is determined by the total resource each of
these nodes receives, i.e., not only from that allocated by node i.
Figure 3: Structure of a graph with K∗ = 7 levels.
For example, Q2 consists of the nodes in N that remain
after removing those that belong to the level sets L1 and
LK . In the sequel, a quantity X referring to induced sub-
graph GQk = (Qk, EQk) is denoted XQk . The next Theorem
describes the structure of a lex-optimal allocation.
Theorem 1. If an allocation d∗ is lex-optimal and K ≥ 2,
then the following Properties hold:
1. L∗k is an independent set in graphGQk , for k = 1, ...., ⌊
K
2
⌋.
2. L∗K−k+1 = NQk (L
∗
k), for k = 1, ...., ⌊
K
2
⌋.
3. l∗kl
∗
K−k+1 = 1, for k = 1, ...., ⌊K/2⌋.
4.
∑
i∈L∗
k
r∗i =
∑
i∈L∗
K−k+1
Di, for k = 1, ...., ⌊
K
2
⌋.
Interestingly, sufficiency of this result holds as well:
Theorem 2. If an allocation d with K ≥ 2 has properties
1-4 of Theorem 1, then it is lex-optimal.
Finally, when there is only one level set, it holds:
Theorem 3. If an allocation d∗ is lex-optimal, andK∗ = 1,
then l∗1 = 1. Also, if an allocation d has K = 1, then l1 = 1
and it is lex-optimal.
3.1 Analysis and Discussion
Let us now discuss the implications of the above theorems.
Under a lex-optimal allocation, the nodes are classified in
disjoint sets of different levels, in a fashion that depends
both on their resource endowments and on the graph G. For
the discussion below, please refer to Fig. 3, that presents an
example of the structure for K∗ = 7 levels. In this graph,
we depict with solid lines the physical connections that may
exist among the different sets of nodes. Notice that the
actual nodes and their detailed connections are not shown.
Exchange ratios Structure. According to Property 3 of
Theorem 1, the exchange ratios have a certain structure.
Specifically, the highest level of ratios is inversely propor-
tional to the lowest level of ratios (l∗7 = 1/l
∗
1), the second
highest exchange ratio level is inversely proportional to the
second lowest ratio level (l∗6 = 1/l
∗
2), and so on. Addition-
ally, resource exchanges satisfy Property 4. For example, in
Fig. 3 all the nodes of the highest ratio set L∗7, allocate their
entire resources to the nodes belonging to the lowest level
set L∗1. Moreover, the latter receive resource only from the
nodes in L∗7. Similarly, the nodes in level set L
∗
6 allocate all
their received resources to nodes in set L∗2 which are served
only by these former nodes, and so on. Interestingly, when
K∗ is odd, there is one set of nodes, here the set L∗4, which
exchange resource only with each other.
Topological Properties. On the other hand, Properties
1 and 2 reveal the impact of the network topology on the
max-min solution. First, from Property 2, we can find the
possible neighbors for each node, based on the level set it
belongs to. For example, when K∗ = 7, it holds L∗7 =
N (L∗1), i.e., the neighbors of nodes in L
∗
1, that do not have
ratios l∗1 , belong only to set L
∗
7. Moreover, since Property 1
states that the set L∗1 in independent in the graph GQ1 , G,
we understand that L1 nodes have neighbors only in L7.
Similarly, it holds that L∗6 = NQ2(L
∗
2). Hence, the nodes
in set L∗2 can have links only with nodes in set L
∗
6 and pos-
sibly with nodes in L∗7 (since the latter do not belong in
GQ2). However, from Lemma 1 it follows that nodes in L
∗
2
exchange resource only with nodes in L∗6. With the same
reasoning, it is easy to see that nodes in set L∗3 can be phys-
ically connected with nodes in L∗7, L
∗
6 and L
∗
5, but they
exchange resource only with nodes in the latter set. Finally,
nodes in set L∗4 exchange resources only with each other.
These properties reveal how the graph affects the lex-
optimal fair solution. For example, by adding a link between
two nodes initially belonging to L∗1 (which is independent),
the lex-optimal solution changes and places these (now con-
nected) nodes to another set. This dependency among the
graph structure and the lex-optimal exchange ratio vector
will become more evident in the sequel.
3.2 Proofs of Theorems
In this subsection we provide the proofs of Theorems 3
and 1, while Theorem 2 is proved in the Appendix.
3.2.1 PROOF of Theorem 3. Before proceeding with
the proof, we provide some additional notation, lemmas and
propositions. We denote the sum of received resources that
are incoming to, and outgoing from set S ⊆ N , under allo-
cation d, as follows:
In (S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dji, Out (S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dij , (3)
where Sc = N −S is the complement set of S . By definition
it is In(N ) = Out(N ) = 0, and also:
In (S) = Out(Sc), Out(S) = In(Sc) . (4)
Lemma 2. For any set S ⊆ N , under any feasible alloca-
tion d ∈ D, it holds∑
i∈S
ri +Out (S) =
∑
i∈S
Di + In (S) . (5)
Out (S) ≤
∑
i∈S
Di (6)
with equality holding iff all nodes in S give their resource
only to nodes outside S . Also, it is:
In (S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ri (7)
with equality holding iff all nodes in S get resource only
from nodes outside S .
Proof. Note that for any node set S , the following holds:∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dji =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dij . (8)
Also, by definition
ri =
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dji +
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dji, (9)
by feasibility of d ∈ D,
Di =
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dij +
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dij . (10)
Hence we calculate∑
i∈S
ri =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dji +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dji by (9)
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dij + In (S) by (8), (3)
=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩S
dij +
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Ni∩Sc
dij + In (S)−Out (S)
=
∑
i∈S
Di + In (S)−Out (S) by (10)
Inequalities (6), (7) follow directly from the definitions. 
Lemma 3. Let d ∈ D. If K = 1 then l1 = 1. If K > 1 ,
then l1 < 1 and lK > 1.
Proof. If K = 1, we have ri = l1Di for all i ∈ N . From
Lemma 2 (applied with S ← N ) we then have l1
∑
i∈N Di =∑
i∈N Di, hence l1 = 1. Let now K > 1. If l1 ≥ 1, then
since lK > l1, we have∑
i∈N
ri =
K∑
k=1
lk
∑
i∈Lk
Di >
∑
i∈N
Di (11)
which contradicts Lemma 2. Similarly is shown lK > 1.

Proposition 4. Let d¯ ∈ D. If K¯ = 1 then d¯ is lex-optimal.
Proof. From Lemma 3, l¯1 = 1 and hence r¯i = Di, i ∈ N .
If there is another allocation dˆ such rˆ ≻ r¯, then it should
hold rˆi ≥ ri = Di ∀i ∈ N and rˆj > r¯j = Dj for at least one
j ∈ N . But then, it would be
∑
i∈S rˆi >
∑
i∈S Di, which
contradicts (5) (applied with S ← N ). 
Now we are ready to provide the proof of Theorem 3:
From Lemma 3 we have that for a feasible allocation d ∈ D,
with K = 1, it is l1 = 1. From Proposition 4 we also get
that this is a lex-optimal allocation. Moreover, since a lex-
optimal allocation d∗ is also feasible, when K∗ = 1, it is also
l∗1 = 1 from Lemma 3. 
3.2.2 PROOF of Theorem 1. First, we need the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 1. If under a lex-optimal allocation d¯ it holds
k(D¯i) = K
∗ for some i ∈ N , then Ni ⊆ L
∗
K .
Proof. Since under a lex-optimal allocation there can be no
node with level higher that lK∗ , Lemma 1 is applied with
the equality, i.e., ∀ j ∈ H¯i, it holds l
∗
k(j) = l
∗
k(D¯i)
= K∗.
Since the same also holds by definition for all nodes in D¯i,
the results follows. 
We introduce some additional definitions and results. Con-
sider a lex-optimal allocation d¯ and let Z¯ be the subset of
nodes in L∗K , with the property: i ∈ Z¯ iff L
∗
k(D¯i)
= K∗.
Hence any node i in Z¯ ⊂ L∗K gives resource only to nodes
in L∗K . The next lemma shows that the set Z¯ is empty if
K∗ ≥ 2.
Lemma 5. Let d¯ be a lex-optimal allocation. If K∗ ≥ 2,
then Z¯ = ∅, i.e., the nodes in L∗K give all their resource to
nodes outside L∗K . Hence
7,
Out (L∗K) =
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di. (12)
Proof. According to Corollary 1 all neighbors of any node
i ∈ Z¯ are in L∗K . It follows that a node i in Z¯ gets resource
only from nodes in Z¯: if node i was getting resource from
a neighbor node j /∈ Z¯ , then since as the previous sentence
says j ∈ L∗K , node j should belong to Z¯ by definition; which
is a contradiction. This implies that In
(
Z¯
)
= 0 and hence
according to Lemma 2:∑
i∈Z¯
r∗i ≤
∑
i∈Z¯
Di.
If Z¯ 6= ∅, then since r∗i = l
∗
KDi, ∀i ∈ Z¯ , we conclude from
(3.2) that l∗K ≤ 1, which contradicts Lemma 3. Equality
(12) follows immediately: since Z¯ = ∅, the nodes in L∗K give
all their resource to nodes outside L∗K and hence (6) applies
with equality. 
Let G¯ be the set of nodes from which nodes in L∗K get
resource, i.e., G¯ = (i ∈ N : k(D¯i) = K
∗). It holds:
Lemma 6. Let d¯ be a lex-optimal allocation and K∗ ≥ 2.
It holds L∗K ∩ G¯ = ∅. Moreover, the set G¯ is nonempty,
independent, it holds N
(
G¯
)
= L∗K , and
In
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0. (13)
Proof. According to Lemma 5, L∗K ∩ G¯ = Z¯ = ∅. Also,
according to (5), (12), and the definition of G¯, it is∑
i∈L∗
K
r∗i = In (L
∗
K) ≤
∑
i∈G¯
Di.
Since
∑
i∈L∗
K
r∗i = l
∗
K
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di > 0, we get G¯ 6= ∅. Ac-
cording to Corollary 1 and the definition of G¯, it holds Ni ⊆
L∗K , ∀ i ∈ G¯. Since L
∗
K ∩ G¯ = ∅, G¯ is independent.
To show that N
(
G¯
)
= L∗K we argue as follows. According
to Corollary 1, it is N
(
G¯
)
⊆ L∗K . Also, if L
∗
K −N
(
G¯
)
6= ∅,
there would be a node i ∈ L∗K not connected to any of the
nodes in G¯; but since by definition of G¯ node i gets resource
only from nodes in G¯, we would then have r∗i = l
∗
KDi = 0, a
contradiction since l∗K > 1 and Di > 0.
Notice next that N
(
G¯
)
= L∗K and the set G¯ is indepen-
dent, all neighbors of nodes in G¯ are in L∗K , and hence nodes
in G¯ can get resource only from nodes in L∗K . Since by defi-
nition nodes L∗K get resource only from G¯, (13) holds. 
Lemma 7. Let d¯ be a lex-optimal allocation and K∗ ≥ 2.
Let k0 be the index of the smallest level in G¯. Then l
∗
K l
∗
k0
≤ 1.
Strict inequality holds if
1. either Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
> 0,
2. or Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯ − L∗k0 6= ∅.
If Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯K − L
∗
k0
= ∅, then l∗K l
∗
k0
= 1.
7To facilitate the reader, we repeat the notation: Out and Z¯ are
annotated with the bar symbol since they depend on d¯, while the
optimal level sets and the received resources are unique and hence
annotated with the star symbol.
Proof. Since by Lemma 6 G¯ is independent, and N
(
G¯
)
⊆
L∗K , the nodes in G¯ can give resource only to nodes in L
∗
K .
Hence only nodes in L∗K give resource to nodes in
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)c
,
hence:
Out (L∗K) = In
(
G¯
)
+Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
.
Taking into account (12) we conclude:
In
(
G¯
)
=
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di −Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
. (14)
Since nodes in G¯ constitute an independent set it follows:
Out
(
G¯
)
=
∑
i∈G¯
Di. (15)
From Lemma 2 applied to set G¯, and using (14-15) we get∑
i∈G¯
ri = In
(
G¯
)
=
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di −Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
, or
K∗−1∑
k=k0
l∗k
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di =
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di −Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
. (16)
Next, since nodes in L∗K get resource only from nodes in G¯
(and all of it) we have
l∗K
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di =
∑
i∈G¯
Di . (17)
Multiplying (16) and (17), and rearranging terms:
K∗−1∑
k=k0
l∗K l
∗
k
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di =
∑
i∈G¯
Di −
∑
i∈G¯ Di∑
i∈L∗
K
Di
Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
.
(18)
Eq. (18) implies that l∗K l
∗
k0
≤ 1: if l∗K l
∗
k0
> 1 then, because
it will also hold l∗K l
∗
k > 1, ∀k ≥ k0, (18) would not hold.
Now, if Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
> 0 then from (18) we have:
K∗−1∑
k=k0
l∗K l
∗
k
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di <
∑
i∈G¯
Di
and arguing as above we see that necessarily l∗K l
∗
k0
< 1. If
Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯ − L∗k0 6= ∅ then again l
∗
K l
∗
k0
< 1.
To see this, notice that if l∗K l
∗
k0
≥ 1 and G¯ −L∗k0 6= ∅ then it
would hold:
l∗K l
∗
k
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di ≥
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di ∀ k ≥ k0. (19)
Also, since G¯ − L∗k0 6= ∅, for some k > k0 there must be
a nonempty set L∗k ∩ G¯ which implies that the inequality is
strict for some k > k0. Adding inequalities (19) we would
then get,
K∗−1∑
k=k0
l∗K l
∗
k
∑
i∈L∗
k
∩G¯
Di >
∑
i∈G¯
Di,
which contradicts (18).
Assume finally that Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯ − L∗k0 = ∅.
From (18) we have l∗K l
∗
k0
∑
i∈G¯ Di =
∑
i∈G¯Di, and since
G¯ 6= ∅ implies
∑
i∈G¯ Di > 0, we get l
∗
K l
∗
k0
= 1. 
Lemma 8. If K∗ ≥ 2, then the set L∗1 is independent.
Proof. Assume that for some pair i, j ∈ L∗1, it is (i, j) ∈ E .
Consider the largest set C ⊆ L∗1 such that a) C contains
both i and j, b) the induced subgraph of C is connected.
Therefore, each node in C has a node in C, and hence a
node in L∗1 as neighbor. By Lemma 1 we have that under
any lex-optimal allocation d, it holds L∗k(Di) = 1 for all
i ∈ C. That is, all nodes in C give resource only to other
nodes in C, hence, Out(C) = 0. It follows from (5) that∑
i∈C r
∗
i ≥
∑
i∈C Di. But we also have∑
i∈C
r∗i = l
∗
1
∑
i∈C
Di <
∑
i∈C
Di,
since l∗1 < 1 by Lemma 3, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 9. Let d¯ be a lex-optimal allocation and K∗ ≥ 2.
It holds L∗1 ⊆ G¯.
Proof. Let F¯k ,
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)c
∩L∗k, k = 1, ..., K
∗−1. It suffices
to show that F¯1 = ∅. Assume that F¯1 6= ∅. Let B¯ be the
set of nodes in
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)c
that are neighbors of nodes in
F¯1. The set B¯ is nonempty because otherwise, since L
∗
1
(and hence F¯1 ) is an independent set and by Lemma 6 it
is N
(
G¯
)
⊆ L∗K , all neighbors of any node in F¯1 would be in
L∗K which implies that F¯1 ⊆ G¯, a contradiction.
Notice next that (13) and Lemma 1 imply that all nodes
in B¯ give resource only to nodes in F¯1 . Hence
l∗1
∑
i∈F¯1
Di ≥
∑
i∈B¯
Di.
Also, since by Lemma 8 the set F¯1 is independent, and
by (13) nodes in F¯1 do not give resource to nodes in L
∗
K ,
all nodes in this set give resource only to nodes in B¯ and
(notice that since B¯ 6= ∅, is should hold K∗ − 1 ≥ 2),
K∗−1∑
k=2
l∗k
∑
i∈F¯k∩B¯
Di ≥
∑
i∈F¯1
Di.
Multiplying the last two inequalities and canceling terms:
K∗−1∑
k=2
l∗1l
∗
k
∑
i∈F¯k∩B¯
Di ≥
∑
i∈B¯
Di,
which implies that l∗1l
∗
K−1 ≥ 1. But l
∗
k0
l∗K > l
∗
1l
∗
K−1, k0 ≥ 1
and hence l∗k0 l
∗
K > 1, which contradicts Lemma 7. 
Now we are ready to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Let d∗ be a lex-optimal allocation and
K∗ ≥ 2. The set L∗1 is independent, N (L
∗
1) = L
∗
K , and
l∗1 l
∗
K = 1 , (20)∑
i∈L∗
1
r∗i =
∑
i∈L∗
K
Di, (21)
In (L∗1 ∪ L
∗
K) = Out (L
∗
1 ∪ L
∗
K) = 0, (22)
Proof. By Lemma 1 the nodes in the setN (L∗1) = ∪i∈L1Ni−
L∗1 = ∪i∈L1Ni (the last equality hold because ∀i ∈ L
∗
i , it is
Ni ∩ L
∗
1 = ∅) give resource only to nodes in L
∗
1, hence
In (L∗1) =
∑
i∈N(L∗1)
Di .
Also, since L∗1 is an independent set, its nodes give all their
resource to nodes in N (L∗1), hence it is:
Out (L∗1) =
∑
i∈L∗
1
Di .
Applying (5) to the set L∗1, we then have∑
i∈L∗
1
r∗i = l
∗
1
∑
i∈L∗
1
Di =
∑
i∈N(L∗1)
Di (23)
On the other hand, since according to Lemma 5 the nodes
in N (L∗1) ⊆ L
∗
K give all their resource to nodes outside L
∗
K ,
according to (6) applied with equality, we get
Out (N (L∗1)) =
∑
i∈N(L∗1)
Di . (24)
Moreover, L∗1 is an independent set and thus the nodes in
N (L∗1) get all the resource from nodes in L
∗
1. Hence:
In (L∗K) ≥
∑
i∈N(L∗1)
Di.
Applying now (5) to the set N (L∗1) we have:∑
i∈N(L∗1)
r∗i = l
∗
K
∑
i∈N(L∗1)
Di ≥
∑
i∈L∗
1
Di. (25)
Multiplying (23), (25) we get l∗K l
∗
1 ≥ 1. If Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
> 0,
from Lemma 7 we have l∗K l
∗
1 < 1, i.e., a contradiction. If
Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯ − L∗1 6= ∅ then from the same
lemma we have l∗K l
∗
1 < 1, again a contradiction.
The only case that remains is Out
(
G¯ ∪ L∗K
)
= 0 and G¯ −
L∗1 = ∅ (i.e., G¯ ⊆ L
∗
1) which again by the lemma implies
l∗K l
∗
1 = 1. Also, Lemma 9 implies G¯ = L
∗
1. N (L
∗
1) = L
∗
K
follows from Lemma 6, and (21) follows from (23). 
After providing this last proposition, we can proceed with
the proof for Theorem 1: For k = 1, Items 1- 4 follow from
Proposition 10. Hence the theorem is true when K ∈ {2, 3}.
Assume now that K ≥ 4. Since according to Proposition
10 it is Out (L1 ∪ LK) = In (L1 ∪ LK) = 0, the restriction
of d in Q2, dQ2 = {dij}(i,j)∈EQ2
is an allocation on the
graph with K − 2 levels. But then dQ2 must be a lex-
optimal allocation in GQ2 = (Q2, EQ2) since otherwise we
could combine an allocation dˆQ2 ≻ dQ2 with the compo-
nents of d in E − EQ2 and get a lexicographically better
allocation on the original graph. Moreover, by construction
we have for the lowest level set in GQ2 : LQ2,1 = L2 and
LQ2,K−2 = LK−1 = LK−2+1. Hence properties 1- 4 hold
for k = 2 and we can repeat the same arguments for the
graph GQ2to deduce inductively the stated properties for
all k = 1, ...., ⌊K/2⌋. 
4. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
4.1 Coalitional Game
We consider two notions for coalition stability [23], namely
weak and strong stability8. The latter is a more restrictive
8Please note that this service exchange game does not posses the
comprehensive property, due to the fact that nodes allocate their
entire idle resource, and hence we cannot define the inner core
and the Shapley values and compare them with our solution. For
more details on this, please see [23].
condition, and preferable as it ensures there is no other al-
location that will yield a strictly better payoff even for one
user. The main result in this context is:
Theorem 4. Any lex-optimal allocation d∗ yields a received
resource vector r∗, that lies in the core of the NTU service
exchange game, and it is strongly stable.
Therefore, no subset of nodes can deviate and improve
the total received resource, for at least one of its members,
without reducing the total received resource of at least an-
other one of its members. Combining Theorems 1 and 4 we
have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. LetK∗ ≥ 2. Under any lex-optimal allocation
d∗, the respective received resource vector r∗, belongs to
the core of the NTU coalitional servicing game, and has the
following structure:
1. The set of nodes N is partitioned into disjoint groups
M∗1, ...,M
∗
L, where ⌈K
∗/2⌉, and each group contains
nodes with exchange ratios belonging to at most two
different levels.
2. There are exactly ⌊K∗/2⌋ groups with 2 levels. For
group M∗k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ it holds M∗k = L
∗
k ∪
L∗K−k+1.
3. If K∗ is odd, there is also a group with one ratio level,
i.e., M∗⌈K∗/2⌉ = L
∗
⌈K∗/2⌉.
4. It holds, l∗kl
∗
K−k+1 = 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ and if K∗ is
odd, the single level group has ratio l∗⌈K∗/2⌉ = 1.
5. The set ∪
⌊K∗/2⌋
k=1 L
∗
k is independent.
Finally, if K∗ = 1, there is one group of nodes with l∗ = 1.
Analysis and Discussion. Existence of Core. The
above results reveal that this coalitional service exchange
NTU game has always a non-empty core, for any graph G,
and any resource endowments {Di}i∈N . Moreover, the core
contains all lex-optimal allocations, which are also strongly
stable. This is a more demanding condition than the non-
emptiness of the core.
Groups of Nodes. Within the grand coalition, not all the
nodes interact with each other. For example, in Figure 3
where K∗ = 7, all the lex-optimal allocations result in 4
groups (denoted with the dotted circles): M∗1 = L
∗
1 ∪ L
∗
7,
M∗2 = L
∗
2 ∪ L
∗
6, M
∗
3 = L
∗
3 ∪ L
∗
5, and M
∗
4 = L
∗
4. Each
group consists of nodes belonging to one or two exchange
ratio level sets, and none of them exchange resources with
nodes in different groups9. These properties are very useful
for network design. For example, for a given network we
can predict which nodes will interact in the fair and stable
allocation policy, and remove the redundant physical links,
which in certain cases induce additional cost [18].
4.2 Competitive Market
In the competitive market framework, each node acts greed-
ily, without any information about the graph or the other
nodes’ resources, and allocates its resource so as to maxi-
mize the total resource it receives in return. Interestingly,
equilibriums always exist in this autonomous and decentral-
ized setting, and lead to lex-optimal exchange ratio vectors:
9Notice that these groups do not constitute coalitions according
to the given definitions, and they are derived by the grand coali-
tion solution.
Theorem 5. The following hold: (i) There is a lex-optimal
allocation d∗ under which each node i ∈ N gives resource
to its neighbors in proportion to what it gets from them,
i.e., d∗ij = d
∗
jiDi/r
∗
i , or d
∗
ji/d
∗
ij = r
∗
i /Di = l
∗
k(i), j ∈ Ni, and
the neighbors not receiving resource from i have higher ex-
change ratio, i.e., l∗k(j) ≥ 1/l
∗
k(i) = l
∗
k(Di)
, j ∈ Hi. (ii) if the
allocation satisfies the above conditions, then the allocation
is lexicographically optimal.
The proof of the theorem is provided in the Appendix.
Analysis and Discussion. This theorem states that
there is a fair lex-optimal allocation, where every node i ∈ N
serves its neighbors j ∈ Di with a resource dij , so as to have
a constant and equal exchange ratio dij/dji with all of them.
Therefore, the lex-optimal allocation is an exchange equilib-
rium, and, additionally, any possible exchange equilibrium
is also a lex-optimal allocation. In other words, the compet-
itive interactions of rational users embedded in a graph, lead
to the same allocation point that a central designer would
have selected for such a system.
Dynamic Model. An important aspect to notice it that
this framework can capture both models where infinitely di-
visible resources are exchanged among users with different
preferences, and also dynamic settings where users exchange
indivisible resources over time, exploiting their diverse re-
source availability. To make the latter case more clear, con-
sider a dynamic resource exchange system which operates in
the continuous time domain. Every node i ∈ N creates ser-
vice opportunities for its neighbors (or, tokens10) according
to a Poisson process with possibly different rate λi > 0. A
meaningful strategy from the perspective of the nodes is the
following: each node i allocates a token generated at time
t to its neighbor that has, until then, given to i the largest
number of service tokens (per received token from i).
A rational user, with no information about the graph and
the nodes’ endowments, is reasonable to expect that this
strategy can increase its benefit. Besides, this type of best
response policies have been considered before, e.g., for P2P
networks [37] where it was shown that they converge to a
steady state. In our case however, the scheme is decen-
tralized and totally asynchronous. Interestingly, numerical
results in Sec. 6 indicate that such myopic policies do con-
verge to a steady state which moreover satisfies Theorem 5.
This means that this dynamic model has a steady state that
asymptotically coincides with the respective static model,
and the equilibrium can be found if we set Di = λi, ∀ i ∈ N .
This is very important as it reveals that the results of this
work do not apply only for the above static models, but also
characterize the steady state allocations and equilibriums
of more dynamic systems, where idle resources or service
opportunities are created and allocated by each node asyn-
chronously, greedily, and with no global network information
(i.e., beyond the one hop neighbors).
5. LEX-OPTIMAL ALGORITHMS
In this section, we provide a polynomial (in |N |) time
algorithm that finds the lex-optimal allocation, and the re-
spective exchange ratio vectors. The proposed algorithm
uses the idea of max-min programming algorithm proposed
in [35] and takes advantage of the structure of lex-optimal
exchange ratio vector described in Theorem 1 to improve
10These are 0-1 token allocation decisions: whenever a user has
an idle resource, e.g., an amount of unused bandwidth or energy,
it can allocate it to one of its neighbors.
performance. The algorithm is based on the following re-
sult.
Lemma 11. Let d¯ ∈ D and K ≥ 2. If the set L¯1 is inde-
pendent and ∑
i∈L¯1
r¯i =
∑
i∈N(L¯1)
Di, (26)
then:
1. For any allocation dˆ that solves the problem
maximize
d∈D
min
j∈N
rj
dj
(27)
it holds L¯1 ⊆ L̂1 and l¯1 = lˆ1.
2. The set L¯1 coincides with the respective set of the lex-
optimal ratio vector, i.e., L¯1 = L
∗
1 and l¯1 = l
∗
1 .
Proof. 1) Since dˆ solves (27) it holds lˆ1 ≥ l¯1 and hence
rˆi
Di
≥ lˆ1 ≥ l¯1 =
r¯i
Di
, i ∈ L¯1 i.e.,
rˆi ≥ r¯i, i ∈ L¯1. (28)
We will show next that equality holds in (28) which implies
that L¯1 ⊆ L̂1. To see this notice that if strict inequality
holds for at least one i ∈ L¯1 then∑
i∈L¯1
rˆi >
∑
i∈L¯1
r¯i. (29)
But since L¯1 is an independent set, we have∑
i∈L¯1
rˆi = În
(
L¯1
)
≤
∑
i∈N(L¯1)
Di =
∑
i∈L¯1
r¯i (30)
where the inequality holds by definition of inflow, and the
last equality by assumption. This result contradicts (29).
2) Since any lex-optimal allocation dˆ solves (27), we have
L¯1 ⊆ Lˆ1 = L
∗
1. If L¯1 were a strict subset of Lˆ1, then d¯ would
be lexicographically better that dˆ, a contradiction. 
Algorithm 1 provides the details. Recall the definition of
graphs GQk = (Qk, EQk) used in Theorem 1. The number
of iterations of the algorithm is equal to the number of sets
Qk, i.e., ⌈K
∗/2⌉. Since each of the level sets contains at
least 2 nodes, it holds K∗ ≤ N/2, and hence the number of
iterations is at most ⌈N/4⌉.
In Step 3, l∗k is computed as the optimal value of optimiza-
tion problem (1.1.), as ensured by Lemma 11. The latter
optimization problem can be transformed to a linear pro-
gramming problem and hence can be solved in polynomial
time. Note that the dimensionality of the problem is reduced
at each iteration. If the conditions in Steps 5 and 10 are sat-
isfied, then the lex-optimal allocation has been determined
on all links and the algorithm terminates.
The implementation and polynomial complexity of Step 6
will be discussed shortly. This step determines the set L∗k,
and hence L∗K∗−k+1 = N (L
∗
k) and l
∗
K∗−k+1 = 1/l
∗
k. Also, at
the exit from this step, the allocated resources of all outgoing
links from nodes in L∗K∗ to nodes in N −(L
∗
K∗ ∪ L
∗
1), will be
zero and the allocated resources of all outgoing links from
nodes in L∗K∗ to nodes in L
∗
1 will be determined.
Step 8 sets to zero all allocations of incoming links from
nodes in Qk −
(
L∗Qk,1 ∪ L
∗
Qk,2
)
to nodes in L∗Qk,2, as is re-
quired by Theorem 1. Step 9 determines allocations d∗ij , i ∈
Algorithm 1: Finding the Lex-optimal allocation
1 k ← 1;
2 while 1 do
3 Find rˆ and dˆ solving: maximize
d∈DQk
minj∈NQk
rj
Dj
; (1.1)
4 Set l∗Qk,1 to the value of the solution to (1.1.)
5 If (rˆi/Di = 1 i ∈ Qk) then K
∗ = k; Exit;
6 Find the set L∗Qk,1;
7 Determine set L∗Qk,2 = N
(
L∗Qk,1
)
and level value
l∗Qk,2 = 1/l
∗
Qk,1
8 dji ← 0, ∀ (j, i) i ∈ L
∗
Qk,2
, j ∈ QQk -(
L∗Qk,1 ∪ L
∗
Qk,2
)
;
9 Find lex-optimal allocations on links
(i, j) , i ∈ L∗Qk,1, j ∈ L
∗
Qk,2
;
10 If
(
L∗Qk,1 ∪ L
∗
Qk,2
= Qk
)
then K∗ = k; Exit;
11 k ← k + 1;
end
L∗k, j ∈ L
∗
K∗−k+1. Since it is known by Theorem 1 that∑
j∈Ni
d∗ji = 1/l
∗
k, i ∈ L
∗
K∗−k+1,
this steps is equivalent to finding a feasible solution to a
linear programming problem and hence it takes polynomial
time to execute.
Algorithm 2: Finding the set L∗1
1 L = L̂1; rij = r̂ij ; /* on exit L = L
∗
1 ∗ /
2 while ∃ (i, j) where i, j ∈ L and dij1 > 0 for some
j1 ∈ N (L) do
3 Reallocate resource from link (i, j1) to link (i, j)
ensuring that with the new allocation
min{rj/Di, rj1/Di} > l
∗
1 ;
4 Set L ← L− {j};
end
/*on exit the set L is independent*/
5 while ∃ (i, j1), i ∈ N (L) , j1 ∈ N − L with rij1 > 0,
do
6 Reallocate resource from node j1 to a node j in
N (i) ensuring that with the new allocation
min{rj/Di, rj1/Di} > l
∗
1 ;
7 Set L ← L− {j}; /* on exit, set L satisfies (26) */
end
It remains to show that Step 6 has polynomial complex-
ity. According to Lemma 11, the solution to (27) deter-
mines l∗1 < 1 and in general provides a solution L̂1 which
is a superset of L∗1. Furthermore, if by reallocating some of
the link resources d̂ij we are able to create an allocation d¯
such that (i) the set L¯1 is independent, and (ii) the relation∑
i∈L¯1
r¯i =
∑
i∈N(L¯1)Di holds, then it will be L
∗
1 = L¯1.
The resource reallocation is described in Algorithm 2.
There are two iteration loops. First, starting from the set
L = L̂1, if there is a link (i, j) such that i, j ∈ L then we se-
lect a node j1 ∈ N (L), with dij1 > 0, and transfer resource
from link (i, j1) to the link (i, j). This selection is always
possible since otherwise the condition“for all links (i, j) such
that i, j ∈ L there is no node j1 ∈ N (L), with dij1 > 0”
would hold; however, this implies that l∗1 = 1 which is ex-
Figure 4: A network with 6 nodes that create 2 groups,
each one marked with the dotted-line rectangle. There
are 3 different levels of exchange ratios. The color of each
node is analogous to its exchange ratio value (increasing
from white to black colour). The received resources are
r∗1 = 20, r
∗
2 = 40, r
∗
3 = 10, r
∗
4 = 10, r
∗
5 = 60, and r
∗
6 = 30. The
exchange ratios for the nodes belonging to each set are
l∗1 = 0.5, l
∗
2 = 1, and l
∗
3 = 2 respectively.
cluded because at this point we have K∗ ≥ 2. The transfer
of resource from(i, j1) to link (i, j) in Step 3 of the algorithm
ensures that the received resource ratios of nodes j and j1
are larger than l∗1 and hence j necessarily does not belong to
L∗1. Hence on exit from the while loop in Step 2 the set L is
independent. However, in order to ensure equality to L∗1 we
may need to further modify L to ensure that the condition
(26) holds. This is done in the second while loop that starts
at Step 5. Also, at the exit from the algorithm, as a result of
this reallocation process, the allocated resources of all out-
going links from nodes in L∗K∗ to nodes in N − (L
∗
K∗ ∪ L
∗
1)
will be zero and, the allocated resources of all outgoing links
from nodes in L∗K∗ to nodes in L
∗
1 will be determined. As
is clear from the above description, Algorithm 1 and 2 take
polynomial time to execute.
6. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we analyze representative numerical ex-
amples to shed light on the above results. Consider first the
network of Fig. 4 which has 6 nodes. Solid lines represent
the physical connections of each node and dotted arrows
indicate resource allocation. Next to each node i we de-
pict its resource endowment. At the lex-optimal point, we
have K∗ = 3 levels with 3 node sets L∗1 = {1, 6}, L
∗
2 =
{3, 4}, L∗3 = {2, 5} which are marked with different colors.
Let us now verify the properties that the lex-optimal al-
location should have according to Theorem 1. First, no-
tice that set L∗1 is independent in graph G. Moreover, all
the neighbors of nodes in set L∗3, i.e., nodes 2 and 5, be-
long in L∗1. Although nodes in L
∗
3 are physically connected,
they only allocate resource to nodes in L∗1 and it holds∑
i∈L∗
3
Di =
∑
i∈l1
ri = 20 + 30. Moreover, the highest
and the lowest levels satisfy the condition l∗1l
∗
3 = 1.
Similarly, we can verify that the structure of the lex-
optimal allocation satisfies Corollary 2. The nodes are par-
titioned into 2 disjoint groupsM∗1 = L
∗
1 ∪L
∗
3 andM
∗
2 = L
∗
2,
each one containing nodes with at most two levels. Also,
the nodes in L∗1 are connected only to nodes in the set L
∗
3,
and it is l∗2 = 1. Finally, the conditions of Theorem 5 are
satisfied. For example, node 2 allocates resource only to
node 1, with lk(1) = 1/lk(2), and not to node 4 since it is
lk(4) = 1 > 0.5 = lk(D2), where lk(D2) = lk(1).
For the example of Fig. 5 we used a network with 13
nodes that yields K∗ = 6 levels, with l∗1 = 0.25, l
∗
2 = 0.43,
l∗3 = 0.77, l
∗
4 = 2.34, l
∗
5 = 1.3, and l
∗
6 = 4. The sets are
L∗1 = {12, 13}, L
∗
2 = {4, 6, 8, 10}, L
∗
3 = {2}, L
∗
4 = {1},
L∗5 = {3, 5, 7, 9}, and L
∗
6 = {11}. Sets L
∗
1, L
∗
2, and L
∗
3 are
independent in graphs GQ1 , GQ2 , GQ3 , and the set L
∗
1∪L
∗
2∪
Figure 5: A network with 13 nodes which create 3
groups. Received resources are r∗1 = 26, r
∗
2 = 20, r
∗
3 =
39.74, r∗4 = 42.78, r
∗
5 = 93.49, r
∗
6 = 14.97, r
∗
7 = 30.38,
r∗8 = 20.96, r
∗
9 = 30.38, r
∗
10 = 4.28, r
∗
11 = 160, r
∗
12 = 6.25,
and r∗13 = 33.75.
Figure 6: A complete graph of 6 nodes with 1 coalition
and 2 levels.
L∗3 is independent in G. Moreover, it is L
∗
6 = NQ1(L
∗
1), L
∗
5 =
NQ2(L
∗
2) and L
∗
4 = NQ3(L
∗
3), and holds l
∗
6l
∗
1 = l
∗
5l
∗
2 = l
∗
4l
∗
3 =
1. In this example we have 3 disjoint groupsM∗1 = L
∗
1 ∪L
∗
6 ,
M∗2 = L
∗
2 ∪ L
∗
5, and M
∗
3 = L
∗
3 ∪ L
∗
4. We see that links
(10, 11), (5, 11), (1, 3), (1, 5) and (2, 7) are redundant and
can be removed without affecting the lex-optimal allocation.
Figure 6 (right) depicts a complete graph with 6 nodes,
where node i = 4 has level l∗1 = 0.988 while the other nodes
have level l∗2 = 1.012. In general for complete graphs, from
Property 6 of Corollary 2 and the fact that independent sets
in such graphs contain only one node, it follows that lex-
optimal allocations may have at most two levels. Moreover
a complete graph has two levels iff the resource of node i0
with the maximum endowment is larger than the sum of the
resources of the rest of the nodes, and it is L1 = {i0}. On
the other hand, for the respective 6-node ring graph, the
lex-optimal solution yields 2 groups and 4 levels.
Finally, we show that the naive best response strategy
of the nodes in any graph-constrained dynamic resource ex-
change market, converges to a steady state point. Moreover,
the latter coincides with the lex-optimal point of a static
market in which every node has an average resource that is
equal to the respective token generation rate of the dynamic
market, i.e., λi = Di, ∀ i ∈ N . In Figure 7 we present the
quite fast convergence (each slot corresponds to the creation
of a service opportunity) of this scheme for the above four
networks, where we see that the system converges to the
expected ratio values.
7. RELATED WORKS
The model we consider is generic and representative for
many communication or economic networks. For example,
such models arise in graphical economies [19], [20], which ex-
tend the classical Walrasian equilibrium [21] and Arrow - De-
breu analysis [4] by imposing graph constraints on the sub-
sets of buyers and sellers that can trade. However, our model
Figure 7: Convergence results for the dynamic and
asynchronous best response strategy of nodes, for net-
works in Fig. 4 (upper left), Fig. 5 (upper right), Fig. 6-
ring graph (lower left), and Fig. 6-complete graph (lower
right). Horizontal axis is time, and vertical axis shows
the exchange ratio level values.
does not presume any type of money transfers, i.e., there is
no budget constraints (as in typical exchange economies)
and the nodes do not value money (as in market games)
[28]. Similar bartering models have been studied for hous-
ing markets [30] or timeshare exchanges [36], where the focus
has been to prove existence of equilibriums.
Here, we fully characterize the equilibriums, relate them
to the max-min fair solution, and study how they are af-
fected by the graph. We also prove that these exchange
equilibriums lie within the core of the respective NTU game.
Although this relation is known for market games and the re-
spective coalitional games [28], to the best of our knowledge
this is the first result for NTU coalitional graph-constrained
games without money. This property is also related to strong
Nash equilibriums (see [2] and references therein), for which
however there are no general existence results, nor they
are appropriate for this competitive framework. Finally,
[16], and [18] studied also core solutions of coalitional graph
games where the nodes are allowed to create new or severe
existing connections. In our model the graph is exogenously
given, e.g., based on the location of the nodes.
The problem of enabling cooperation in networks (or, net-
worked systems) is of paramount importance and has been
considered in different contexts, such as routing in ad hoc
networks [7], WiFi sharing models [9], mesh networks [38],
and P2P overlays [5]. This is a problem that gains increasing
interest in communication networks [32], [34], [11], [8], and
in social and economic networks as well [6], [19], [18]. Unlike
previous works, our model does not presume any kind of in-
frastructure, e.g., for transaction or reputation systems. In-
stead, we show numerically that asynchronous best response
algorithms, with no information about the graph and re-
source endowments, converge to a fair and robust (i.e., in
the core) exchange equilibrium.
Previous works e.g., [37] have studied similar mechanisms
for P2P file sharing systems, without however characteriz-
ing its properties and relation to competitive and coalitional
equilibriums. The max-min fair criterion is natural for this
setting, as it is defined with respect to each user’s contribu-
tion. Also, while our model is similar to previous works, e.g.,
see [5] and references therein, our analysis provides novel in-
sights for the structure and properties of the resulting equi-
libriums, and we also propose polynomial-time algorithms
for their calculations. These algorithms can be also used for
deriving the competitive equilibriums in graphical economies
[20], [19].
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We considered a service (or, resource) exchange model
among self-interested nodes embedded in a graph that pre-
scribes their possible interactions. This is a key network
model that represents Internet sharing communities [11],
[32], [34], [8], P2P file sharing [5], [22], energy sharing net-
works [29], graphical economies [19], [20] and many online
resource sharing platforms [6], [25], [1], [31], [17]. Such sys-
tems can be dynamic where the users share their resource
surpluses that they have in different (and diverse) time in-
stances, or static where users having different resource pref-
erences barter with each other so as to acquire the resources
they value higher. Despite the large interest of the research
community and the previous contributions for specific re-
lated models (e.g., for P2P overlays), the fundamental prop-
erties of these systems remain unexplored.
We showed that the max-min fair policy exhibits a very
rich structure, and characterized its properties for any given
graph and node resource endowments. More importantly, we
proved that this policy coincides with the exchange equilib-
rium of the respective competitive game, and lies in the core
of the respective NTU coalitional game. This important re-
sult reveals that there is a unifying approach that solves the
resource allocation problem for graph-constrained systems
(or, economies), for different node behaviors. In other words,
we can apply the max-min fair criterion, that has been ex-
tensively used for load balancing in centralized communica-
tion networks (e.g., see [24] and references therein), to ser-
vice exchange models with autonomous and selfish nodes.
Finally, our findings contribute to the game theoretic lit-
erature since the connection between the competitive equi-
librium for this graph-constrained model and the core of the
respective NTU coalitional game is a new finding. We also
proved the more strict strong stability property. A special
aspect of our model is that we do not consider side pay-
ments (money), not even in the form of budget constraints.
This renders the analysis significantly different than most
of the previous models [28], [6], [37], yet very appropriate
for the considered problem. We believe that these results
open many fascinating directions for future work. Among
them, it is important to relax the common assumption of
large demand that exceeds resource availability for the users
(considered also in [5], [37], [29], [19], [20], [23], [9]), and
provide a formal proof for the convergence of the dynamic
asynchronous user interaction model.
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Appendix
We provide the additional proofs for the theorems and the
lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 5
We begin with (i). Let d¯ be a lex-optimal allocation. Start-
ing from d¯ we will construct d by a sequence of link resource
reallocations. Notice that for any allocation dˆ, it holds:
rˆi = lˆkˆ(i)Di =
∑
j∈Ni
(
lˆkˆ(i)dˆij
)
=
∑
j∈Ni
dˆji (31)
where the first equality is by definition of lˆkˆ(i), the second
by (1), and the last by definition of ri. Hence under any
allocation dˆ we have the following fact.
lˆkˆ(i)dˆij1 > dˆj1i for some j1 ∈ Ni,
iff lˆk(i)dˆij2 < dˆj2i for another j2 ∈ Ni. (32)
Let Y0 be the set of links (i, j) for which it holds l¯k¯(i)d¯ij >
d¯ji. If Y0 is nonempty, we will show that we can reallocate
resource so that under the new allocaton d1, the resources
the nodes receive remain the same, while for at least one
of the links (i, j) in Y0 it holds, l¯k¯(i)d¯ij = d¯ji while the
rest of the inequalities still hold in their original direction.
Hence the new allocation d1 is also lex-optimal, while Y1 =
Y0−{(i, j)}. Proceeding in this manner we will arrive at an
allocation d which is still lex-optimal but for which Y = ∅.
Based on (32) we will then conclude that the last allocation
satisfies
d∗ji/d
∗
ij = r
∗
i /Di = l
∗
k(i), j ∈ Ni, (33)
as stated in (i). Also, let (i1, i0) be a link such that l¯k¯(i1)d¯i1i0 >
d¯i0i1 ≥ 0 (hence l¯k¯(i1) > 0). Then according to (32) there
must be a link (i1, i2) such that l¯k¯(i1)d¯i1i2 < d¯i2i1 or
1
l¯k¯(i1)
d¯i2i1 > d¯i1i2 ≥ 0.
But due to lex optimality of d¯, we conclude from Corollary
2 Property 4 that l¯k¯(i2) =
(
1/l¯k¯(i1)
)
and hence the above
becomes l¯k¯(i2)d¯i2i1 > d¯i1i2 . Repeating this procedure we
find a sequence of links (im, im−1) , m = 1, 2, .. for which it
holds:
l¯k¯(im)d¯imim−1 > d¯im−1im . (34)
Since the number of nodes is finite, we will eventually find a
simple (no repeated nodes) cycle that satisfies (34). For all
nodes m = 1, 2, ..M on this cycle, subtract resource δ from
d¯imim−1 and increase by δ the resource d¯imim+1 . In addition,
we require that the following relation must be satisfied for
all nodes m on the cycle,
l¯im (d¯imim−1 − δ) ≥ d¯im−1im + δ, m = 1, 2, ...,M, or (35)
0 < δ ≤
l¯im d¯imim−1 − d¯im−1im
l¯im + 1
, m = 1, 2, ..., M
This choice of δ ensures that the increase-decrease of re-
source allocation gives a new allocation and that with the
new allocation inequalities (34) either still hold in their orig-
inal direction or become equalities Since we have a cycle,
this increase-decrease does not alter the resource the nodes
of the cycle get. Since the resources of the rest of the nodes
in the network are not changed, the resulting allocation is
still lex-optimal. We now pick
δ1 = max
m
{
l¯im d¯imim−1 − d¯im−1im
l¯im + 1
}
> 0.
This choice ensures that at least one of the inequalities (34)
become equality for some node in the cycle as desired.
Next we prove (ii). First, we need a useful result: if an
allocation d satisfies d∗ji = d
∗
ijl
∗
k(i), j ∈ Ni, then for any node
j ∈ Di it holds:
lk(j) > 0, and lk(j) = 1/lk(i) (36)
To see this, note that since j ∈ Di, by definition dij > 0,
hence lk(j) = (rj/Dj) ≥ (dij/Dj) > 0 and since by assump-
tion
dij = lk(j)dji, (37)
it also holds dji > 0. Next, since by assumption
dji = lk(i)dij , (38)
multiplying (37) (38) and canceling (the nonzero) terms we
have lki lkj = 1. Therefore (37) holds.
Now, notice first that any node i gives resource to at least
one node j, hence dij > 0. Therefore, it follows from eq.
(36) that l1 > 0. If under allocation d there is only one
level, i.e., K = 1, then by Proposition 4, it is lex-optimal.
Hence we concentrate on the case K ≥ 2. We will show that
allocation d satisfies the properties of Theorem 1 and hence,
by Theorem 2, it is lex-optimal.
Consider first k = 1. The nodes in L1 constitute an in-
dependent set. To see this note that dij = 0 for all links
(i, j) with i, j ∈ L1 since otherwise (i.e., dij > 0) by eq.
(36), and the fact that lk(1) = lk(2) = l1 it will follow that
l1 = 1, which contradicts Lemma 3. Hence all nodes in L1
give their resource to nodes in higher layers. Using again
eq. (36), we conclude that all nodes in L1 give resource
to nodes at level with value 1/l1. Now, if there is a link
(i, j) ∈ E with i, j ∈ L1 then since dij = 0, the condition in
(i), i.e., ”the neighbors not receiving resource from i have
higher exchange ratio” (which holds according to Lemma 1),
implies that lk(j) ≥ 1/l1 and since lk(j) = l1, we conclude
l1 ≥ 1, a contradiction. Hence Item 1 of Theorem 1 holds
for k = 1.
Consider now the nodes in N (L1). Nodes in N (L1) give
resource only to nodes in L1. To see this, note that if node
j ∈ N (L1) were giving resource to a node i /∈ L1, then,
since there are neighbors of j in L1 by a similar reasoning
(”the neighbors not receiving resource from i have higher
exchange ratio”, Lemma 1), it would hold l1 ≥ lk(i), i.e.,
l1 = lk(i), which contradicts the fact that i /∈ L1. Since
all nodes in N (L1) give resource to nodes in L1 it follows
from (36) that all nodes in N (L1) are at the same level and
lk(N (L1)) = 1/l1.
We claim now that for any node i ∈ N −N (L1) it holds,
lk(i) < lk(N (L1)) which implies that LK = N (L1) and hence
Item 2 of Theorem 1 holds for k = 1. Indeed, assume that
lk(i) ≥ lk(N (L1)) = 1/l1. Then since node i gives resource
to at least another neighbor node j, by (36) we would have
lk(j) =
(
1/lk(i)
)
≤ l1 hence lk(j) = l1, i.e., j ∈ L1 which
contradicts the fact that i ∈ N −N (L1).
The fact that Item 3 of Theorem 1 holds for k = 1, follows
again from (36). Also, Item 4 of Theorem 1 holds since as
shown above, all nodes in L1 =N (L1) give their resource to
nodes in L1. If K = 2, the lex- optimality of d follows from
Theorem 2. Consider next K ≥ 3. According to Lemma 12,
it holds
In (Lk ∪ LK−k+1) = Out (Lk ∪ LK−k+1) = 0,
hence the restriction of d on Q2, dQ2 constitutes an alloca-
tion on GQ2with KQ2 = K − 2 levels. Moreover, since no
nodes at levels L1 and LK are in Q2, we have LQ2,1 = L2,
and LQ2,KQ2 = LK−1. Also, (36) and (ii) continue to hold
for dQ2 on GQ2 . If K = 3, then we have KQ2 = 1, hence
Item of Theorem 1 holds. If K ≥ 4, we can apply now the
arguments we used for k = 1 to show that Items 1-4 hold
for k = 2. Proceeding iteratively we show that all properties
in Theorem 1 hold for d and hence it is lex-optimal. 
PROOF of Theorem 2
Before proving Theorem 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 12. If an allocation d with K ≥ 2 satisfies Prop-
erties 1- 4 of Theorem 1, it holds for k = 1, ..., ⌊K/2⌋:
In (Lk ∪ LK−k+1) = Out (Lk ∪ LK−k+1) = 0. (39)
Proof. Let k = 1. Since by Property 1 of Theorem 1 the set
L1 is independent, we have
∑
i∈L1
ri = In (L1). Also, since
only nodes in NQ1 (L1) = N (L1) = LK may have links with
nodes in (L1 ∪ LK)
c, we have Out (LK) = Out (L1 ∪ LK) +
In (L1), and hence:∑
i∈LK
Di ≥ Out (LK) = Out (L1 ∪ LK) + In (L1)
= Out (L1 ∪ LK) +
∑
i∈L1
ri = Out (L1 ∪ LK) +
∑
i∈LK
Di,
where the last equality is due to Property 4 of Th. 1. The
last equality implies that Out (L1 ∪ LK) = 0 and:
Out (LK) =
∑
i∈LK
Di. (40)
Next, we have for the nodes in LK :∑
i∈LK
ri +Out (LK) =
∑
LK
Di + In (LK)
Since by independence of L1 it holds:
In (LK) =
∑
i∈L1
Di + In (L1 ∪ LK) ,
and taking into account (40), we conclude from (5)
∑
i∈LK
ri =∑
i∈L1
Di + In (Lk ∪ LK), or since ri = lKDi, i ∈ LK , it is:
lK
∑
i∈LK
Di =
∑
i∈L1
Di + In (Lk ∪NQk (Lk)) .
Similarly, from the equality in Property 4 we have l1
∑
i∈L1
Di =∑
i∈LK
Di. Multiplying the last two equalities and rearrang-
ing terms we get:
l1lK = 1 +
In (L1 ∪ LK)(∑
i∈L1
Di
)(∑
i∈LK
ri
) . (41)
But since by Item 3 of Theorem 1 it hold l1lK = 1, we
conclude that In (L1 ∪ LK) = 0.
Hence, if K ∈ {2, 3} the lemma holds. Next, assume
K ≥ 4 and observe that since (39) holds for k = 1, the
restriction dQ2 of d to Q2 is an allocation on Q2 with K−2
levels and by construction LQ2,1 = L2, LQ2,K−2 = LK−1 =
LK−2+1. Therefore, we can repeat the arguments above
for k = 2 and inductively show that the lemma holds for
k = 1, ...., ⌊K∗/2⌋. 
Proof of Theorem 2: For k = 1, since by Properties 1 and
4 of Theorem 1 L¯1 is an independent set and
∑
i∈L1
r∗1 =∑
i∈N (L1)
Di, it follows from Lemma 11 that L
∗
1 = L1 and
l∗1 = l1. Also, by Properties 2, 3 of Theorem 1 we have
lK = l
∗
K∗ and LK = N (L1) = N (L
∗
1) = L
∗
K∗ , where
the last equality follows from Proposition 10. If K = 2,
then since N = L1 ∪ L2 = L
∗
1 ∪ L
∗
K∗ we have necessar-
ily K∗ = 2 and we conclude that d is lex-optimal. As-
sume now that K = 3. From Proposition 10 we then have
In (L1 ∪ L3) = Out (L2 ∪ L3) = 0. Hence the restriction
dQ2 is an allocation on GQ2 with KQ2 = 1. It follows by
Proposition 4 that dQ2 is lex-optimal in GQ2 and l2 = 1.
This implies that any lex-optimal allocation allocation on
GQ2 has K
∗
Q2 = 1 and l
∗
2 = 1. We then conclude that
K∗ = 3 and arguing as in the case K = 2, that d is lex-
optimal.
We will use induction to show the Theorem for allocations
d with arbitray K. Assume that the theorem holds for allo-
cation with up to K − 1, K ≥ 4 levels and let next K ≥ 4.
By (22), the vector dQ2 constitutes an allocation on graph
GQ2 . Since this allocation has K−2 levels we can apply the
inductive hypothesis to conclude that the allocation dQ2 is
lex-optimal in GQ2 . But the same holds for the restriction
dˆQ2 to GQ2 , of any lex-optimal allocation dˆ. By uniqueness
of lex optimality we conclude that all levels lk, level sets
Lk and received resource ri of dQ2 for k = 2, ..., K − 1 are
identical to those of any lex-optimal allocation. It follows
that K = K∗ and we already showed that L∗1 = L1, l1 = l
∗
1
LK = L
∗
K∗ , and lK = l
∗
K∗ . The lex-optimality of d follows.

Proof of Theorem 4
Corollary 2 is a simple consequence of the properties of the
lex-optimal policies and can be derived by combining The-
orems 1 and 4. Hence, we only need to focus on the main
result of this subsection, i.e., Theorem 4.
Proof. Based on the results of Theorem 1 (and using the
notation of Corollary 2), let M∗k = L
∗
k ∪ L
∗
K−k+1, k =
1, 2, ..., ⌊K∗/2⌋ be the formed groups under d; if K∗ is odd,
there is also a groupM∗⌈K∗/2⌉ = L
∗
⌈K∗/2⌉. Below it will help
to denote L1,k , L
∗
k and L2,k , L
∗
N−k+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋
so that M∗k = L1,k ∪ L2,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋. We also
define l1,k , l
∗
k and l2,k , l
∗
N−k+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ . If
K∗ is odd then define L1,⌈K∗/2⌉ = ∅ L2,⌈K∗/2⌉ = L
∗
⌈K∗/2⌉,
l1,⌈K∗/2⌉ = l2,⌈K∗/2⌉ = l
∗
⌈K∗/2⌉=1.
Consider an arbitrary nonempty set of nodes C and define
C1,k = C ∩ L1,k, C2,k = C ∩ L2,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋, and in
case K∗ is odd, C2,⌈K∗/2⌉ = C∩L⌈K∗/2⌉. Hence C1,k∪C2,k =
M∗k ∩C. Let dˆ be an allocation on this set such that rˆi ≥ r
∗
i
for all i ∈ C and rˆj0 > r
∗
j0 for some j0 ∈ C. Below we argue
by contradiction that such set does not exist. In the case
where the induced subgraph contains singletons, the results
is trivial.
From Theorem 1 and specifically the properties of the lex-
optimal allocations, we know that the nodes in the set L∗k,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K∗/2 may be connected only to nodes in sets
L∗K−m+1, with 1 ≤ m ≤ k. Hence, we have the following
properties
1. Nodes in L1,k 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ may be connected to
nodes in L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ k.
2. Nodes in L2,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ may be connected to
nodes in all sets L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ ⌈K
∗/2⌉ and to nodes
in the sets L1,m, k ≤ m ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ .
3. If K∗ is odd, then nodes in L2,⌈K∗/2⌉ may be connected
to nodes in all sets L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ ⌈K
∗/2⌉.
Under allocation dˆ, let a
(h,m)
(t,k) be the proportion of offered
resource by the nodes in Ct,k ( i.e.,
∑
i∈Ct,k
Di ) to nodes in
Ch,m. From Properties 1) and 2) above we then have for any
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋
k∑
m=1
a
(2,m)
(1,k)
= 1 (42)
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,m)
(2,k) +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=k
a
(1,m)
(2,k) = 1, (43)
and from Property 3, if K∗ is odd,
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,m)
(2,⌈K∗/2⌉) = 1. (44)
Since nodes in C1,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ may be connected
and hence get their resource from nodes in L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ k,
we have, for every 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋:
k∑
m=1
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di =
∑
i∈C1,k
rˆi ≥ l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di, (45)
with strict inequality holding if j0 ∈ C1,k for some k, 1 ≤
k ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋ .
Similarly, since nodes in C2,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ may
be connected and hence get their resource from nodes in
L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ ⌈K
∗/2⌉ and from nodes in the sets L1,m, k ≤
m ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋, it holds:
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=k
a
(2,k)
(1,m)
∑
i∈C1,m
Di
=
∑
i∈C2,k
rˆi ≥ l2,k
∑
i∈C2,k
Di, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K
∗/2⌋ , (46)
with strict inequality holding if j0 ∈ C2,k for some k, 1 ≤
k ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋ .
For a given k, multiplying (46) by l1,k, adding (45), and
considering that l1,kl2,k = l
∗
kl
∗
N−k+1 = 1, we get:
k∑
m=1
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di + l1,k
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+ l1,k
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=k
a
(2,k)
(1,m)
∑
i∈C1,m
Di
≥ l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di +
∑
i∈C2,k
Di, k = 1, ..., ⌊K
∗/2⌋ , (47)
with strict inequality holding if j0 ∈ C1,k ∪ C2,k for some
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ ⌊K∗/2⌋ . Adding the inequalities in (47) we get
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
k∑
m=1,
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=k
a
(2,k)
(1,m)
∑
i∈C1,m
Di
≥
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
∑
i∈C2,k
Di, (48)
with strict inequality holding if j0 ∈ ∪
⌊K∗/2⌋
k=1 (C1,k ∪ C2,k) .
Note now that:
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
k∑
m=1
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di =
=
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1
( ⌊K∗2 ⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
) ∑
i∈C2,m
Di (49)
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=k
a
(2,k)
(1,m)
∑
i∈C1,m
Di =
=
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1
( m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
) ∑
i∈C1,m
Di (50)
where we have applied the identity
K∑
k=1
k∑
m=1
akm =
K∑
m=1
K∑
k=m
akm (51)
Also, if K∗ is even, then since ⌊K∗/2⌋ = ⌈K∗/2⌉,
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di =
=
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1
( ⌊K∗2 ⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m)
) ∑
i∈C2,m
Di, (52)
while if K∗is odd,
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌈
K∗
2
⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di =
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1
( ⌊K∗2 ⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m)
)
·
·
∑
i∈C2,m
Di +
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,⌈K∗2 ⌉)
∑
i∈C
2,⌈K∗2 ⌉
Di (53)
where we applied the identity
K∑
k=1
K+1∑
m=1
akm =
K∑
m=1
K∑
k=m
akm +
K∑
k=1
ak,(K+1). (54)
Assume now that K∗ is even. Using equalities (49), (50),
and (52) in (48), we get:
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
⌊K
∗/2⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m) +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m)
 ∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
(
m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
) ∑
i∈C1,m
Di
>
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
∑
i∈C2,k
Di (55)
where the inequality is strict since now
j0 ∈ C = ∪
⌊K∗/2⌋
k=1 (C1,k ∪ C2,k) .
But since l1,k < 1, ∀ k ∈ [1,
⌊
K∗
2
⌋
], we have:
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m) +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m) ≤ (56)
≤
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m) +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m) = 1 ,by (43)
Taking into account that l1,k < li,k′ if k < k
′, we also have,
m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
≤ l1,m
m∑
k=1
a
(2,k)
(1,m)
= l1,m by (42) (57)
Hence, it holds:
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
⌊K
∗/2⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m) +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
a
(2,k)
(2,m)
 ∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
(
m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
) ∑
i∈C1,m
Di
≤
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
∑
i∈C2,m
Di +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
l1,m
∑
i∈C1,m
Di (58)
which contradicts (55).
It remains to consider the case that K∗ is odd. In this
case, using equalities (49), (50), and (53) in (48), we obtain,
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
⌊K
∗/2⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m)
 ∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
m=1
(
m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
) ∑
i∈C1,m
Di
+
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,⌈K∗/2⌉)
∑
i∈C2,⌈K∗/2⌉
Di
≥
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di +
⌊K∗/2⌋∑
k=1
∑
i∈C2,k
Di (59)
with strict inequality holding if j0 ∈ ∪
⌊K∗/2⌋
k=1 (C1,k ∪ C2,k) .
Observe now that since nodes in L2,⌈K∗/2⌉ may be con-
nected to nodes in all sets L2,m, 1 ≤ m ≤ ⌈K
∗/2⌉ we have,
⌈K∗/2⌉∑
m=1
a
(2,⌈K∗/2⌉)
(2,m)
∑
i∈C2,m
Di
=
∑
i∈C2,⌈K∗/2⌉
rˆi ≥ l1,⌈K∗/2⌉
∑
i∈C1,⌈K∗/2⌉
Di
=
∑
i∈C1,⌈K∗/2⌉
Di , since l1,⌈K∗/2⌉ = 1. (60)
with equality holding if j0 ∈ C1,⌈K∗/2⌉. Adding (59), (60):
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1

⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=m
a
(1,k)
(2,m)
+
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,m)
+ a
(1,
⌈
K∗
2
⌉
)
(2,m)
 ∑
i∈C2,m
Di
+
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
m=1
(
m∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(1,m)
) ∑
i∈C1,m
Di +
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,ka
(2,k)
(2,⌈K∗2 ⌉)
·
·
∑
i∈C
2,⌈K∗2 ⌉
Di >
⌊
K∗
2
⌋∑
k=1
l1,k
∑
i∈C1,k
Di +
⌈
K∗
2
⌉∑
k=1
∑
i∈C2,k
Di (61)
where the inequality is strict since j0 ∈ C = ∪
⌈K∗/2⌉
k=1 (C1,k ∪ C2,k).
Using again arguments similar to the caseK∗ even, we arrive
again at a contradiction. 
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